There is a segment of the Spanish business landscape that major investors systematically overlook. Not because it is small, but because it does not fit their business model. That segment is the middle market: companies turning over between 10 and 200 million euros, generating EBITDA of between 1 and 20 million, and representing the backbone of Spain’s productive economy.
Mapping the middle market
According to data from the Commercial Registry and the INE, Spain has approximately 4,200 companies in that turnover range. Around 70% of them are family-owned. Most operate in traditional sectors: manufacturing, logistics, distribution, industrial services, hospitality, and food.
These companies share several characteristics relevant to investors. First, they tend to hold leadership positions in specific niches — the largest distributor of a product in a region, the principal provider of a service in a particular sector. Second, they have demonstrated resilience: decades in operation, having survived successive crises while maintaining stable client bases. Third, they have significant operational improvement potential, precisely because they have grown organically without the optimisation resources that professional capital can provide.
The capital gap
The most revealing data point about the Spanish middle market is the gap between opportunity and available capital. According to ASCRI, approximately 7.5 billion euros were invested in private capital in Spain in 2022. Of that, less than 1.2 billion targeted deals below 25 million euros. In other words, the lower middle market — where the vast majority of companies sit — received just 16% of total capital.
Why? The reasons are structural. The large international funds — Blackstone, KKR, CVC — seek deals worth hundreds of millions. It does not pay them to dedicate resources to analysing a company that turns over 30 million. The Spanish mid-market funds that exist are relatively few and subject to the same lifecycle dynamics that limit their flexibility.
This leaves an enormous space for direct investors, family offices, and private estates that can operate with tickets of between 2 and 20 million euros. It is a space where competition is lower, entry prices are more reasonable, and the potential to generate operational — not just financial — value is substantially greater.
Real returns
Discussing returns in the middle market requires honesty. These are not venture capital returns, where one in ten investments may multiply by twenty. They are more modest in terms of multiple but substantially more predictable and with a lower loss rate.
In our experience, a well-executed middle-market deal in Spain generates annualised returns of between 15% and 25% (IRR) over five-to-seven-year horizons. Entry multiples typically range from 4x to 7x EBITDA, depending on sector and company quality. Exit multiples, following operational improvement, can reach 7x-10x.
But what matters most is not the upside — it is the limited downside. When you acquire a profitable company with recurring clients, real assets, and an experienced team, the probability of total loss is very low. The probability that the investment generates a positive return, even if modest, is very high. For an investor building wealth consistently, that asymmetry is enormously attractive.
Sectors with the greatest potential
Not all middle-market sectors are equal. Some offer a particularly compelling combination of fragmentation, capital need, and consolidation potential.
Logistics and transport: Spain is the EU’s second-largest country by area and a natural corridor between Europe and Africa. The logistics sector is enormously fragmented, with thousands of small and mid-sized operators. Consolidation is inevitable and already under way.
Hospitality and catering: With over 300,000 establishments, Spain is a global hospitality powerhouse. The pandemic accelerated a consolidation that was already forming. Chains and groups are absorbing independent operators at a growing pace.
Industrial services: Maintenance, engineering, installations — an invisible but essential sector with stable margins and recurring contracts. Ideal for buy-and-build strategies.
Circular technology: The circular economy is not a fad. European regulation is pushing every industry towards more sustainable models. Companies that facilitate that transition — waste management, industrial recycling, energy efficiency — enjoy a regulatory tailwind that will last decades.
Why now
Three converging factors make the present moment particularly favourable.
First, the succession wave. The founding generation is reaching retirement. This creates an unprecedented and growing flow of acquisition opportunities in Spanish business history.
Second, the interest rate environment. After years of ultra-low rates, monetary normalisation has increased borrowing costs and reduced financial asset valuations. This makes direct investment in real companies comparatively more attractive.
Third, ecosystem maturation. There are more specialised advisers, more lawyers experienced in middle-market M&A, more intermediaries who understand this segment’s dynamics. This reduces transaction costs and improves the quality of opportunities reaching the market.
The Blue Mountain thesis
Our thesis can be summarised in one sentence: buy profitable companies at reasonable prices and make them better. We are not looking for windfalls. We do not buy to flip in two years. We look for companies where we can add real value — management professionalisation, process improvement, commercial expansion, technology integration — and where the entrepreneur or family wants a long-term partner.
It is a thesis that appears conservative but has been extraordinarily profitable in practice. And the Spanish middle market is the perfect ground on which to execute it.
Dirk Manuel Martens Jimenez
Founder, Blue Mountain Capital